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n the United States during 2008–2009, as in previous episodes here and
other countries, supplying funding to ﬁnancial intermediaries and other
ﬁrms was a component of the government’s response to a ﬁnancial cri-
sis. Some of these funding initiatives have been characterized—and, in some
quarters, heavily criticized—as being bailouts: transfers from the govern-
ment, made to ﬁrms (and sometimes other entities such as city governments)
or to their creditors in order to avert insolvency or mitigate its effects, that the
recipients are not anticipated to repay. Note that this deﬁnition distinguishes
bailoutsfrombonaﬁdegovernmentloans.1 HenryThornton(1802)andWalter
Bagehot (1877) explained why it is good public policy for government to lend
to ﬁrms (particularly to banks) in a ﬁnancial crisis, and today that justiﬁcation
is widely accepted. Bailouts remain highly controversial, however.
Many economists perceive bailouts to be a costly manifestation of time
inconsistency on the part of policymakers. That is, the government threatens
that an entity that becomes insolvent must fail rather than being rescued, but
subsequently, perhaps out of fear that insolvency would harm many people
whobearnoresponsibilityforit,theentitywillberescuedwhenpushcomesto
shove. Anticipating this denouement, the owners and managers of the entity
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make inadvisable investments, taking risks that they would have avoided if
the threat not to assist had been taken seriously. This view, formalized by
Kareken (1983) and more recently elaborated by Stern and Feldman (2004),
is a cogent, prima facie reason to judge that bailouts are a socially inefﬁcient
form of government intervention in the economy.
Nevertheless, despite this logic, numerous academic economists, policy-
makers, and market participants argued publicly that the 2008–2009 bailout
was an indispensable policy action. In their view, there was considerable risk
that the economy would have suffered serious, long-term harm if the ﬁnance,
automobile, andhousingindustrieshadnotbeensubsidized. Presumablythey
wereconcernedthatmillionsofpeoplewouldfacethesortofimmediateharm
that expositions of the time-inconsistency argument typically cite, but they
spoke of a greater, more persistent harm. In their view, if government did not
provide a bailout in circumstances where to do so was vital, then incentives
for socially beneﬁcial investment would be impaired in a way that might take
decades to repair. This vision is the polar opposite of the time-inconsistency
vision, which sees investment incentives being harmed by the occurrence of
bailouts rather than by their nonoccurrence.
The goal of this article is to formulate an economic model, in terms of
which the concern just described can be understood. This is a very limited
goal. Itisnoteventoprovideaprimafacieargumentthatconductingabailout
islikelytobegoodpolicy. Tomeetthegoal,themodelneedonlyestablishthat
a bailout would be economically efﬁcient under some conceivable conditions
in some economy that shares salient features of the actual one.
In an economy in which a bailout of ﬁrms might be efﬁcient, there must
be some reason for production to be undertaken by ﬁrms that issue ﬁnancial
claims against which they might default. This feature is necessary because, if
there were no good reason for ﬁrms ever to become insolvent, then an optimal
policywouldbetopreventthemfromevertakingthatrisk,ratherthantoallow
them to take it and to help them when insolvency occurs.
In particular, besides ﬁrms being able to do something for their investors
thattheinvestorscannotdoforthemselves, theremustbesomeconstraintona
ﬁrm’s ability to issue ﬁnancial claims that would only have to be paid in those
states of nature where the ﬁrm had the capacity to pay them. The Modigliani-
Miller theorem (cf. Stiglitz 1969) states that, if a ﬁrm could contract ex ante
for the payments that it could make and receive at every date, in any state of
the world, then any production plan could be ﬁnanced in such a way that the
ﬁrm could not possibly become insolvent. Thus, a threshold condition for an
economic model to be suitable for studying insolvency is that it must rule out
some contracts that a ﬁrm might make in principle so that the no-insolvency
implication of the Modigliani-Miller theorem will be avoided.
A well-known model with these features is the model of bank runs formu-
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A ﬁrm (which those authors interpret to be a bank) can improve on autarkic
production by pooling its investors’ risks of idiosyncratic shocks to their re-
spective preferences. It is assumed that the ﬁrm can only fund its production
by issuing standard debt contracts rather than by issuing ﬁnancial claims in a
completely ﬂexible manner.
The model to be formulated here closely resembles the Diamond-Dybvig
model. Although those authors (and also Bryant) were particularly concerned
with the possibility that a solvent ﬁrm might become illiquid—indeed, to
formalize that distinction was an important aspect of their contribution—the
modelcanbeparameterizedinsuchawaythatoptimalﬁnancialandproduction
decisions must lead to insolvency in some states of the world.
Rather than assuming that a standard debt contract is the only available
ﬁnancial claim, ﬁnancial ﬂexibility will be constrained in the present model
byassumingthattheﬁrmisalimited-liabilitycorporation. Infact, Modigliani
andMillercitedlimitedliabilityasaconsiderationthatarguablypreventstheir
theorem from holding precisely in an actual economy. Like the Diamond-
Dybvig model, the present model is a partial-equilibrium model in the sense
thatitassumesaconstraintonﬁnancingopportunities,ratherthanderivingthat
constraint as an implication of, or as an optimal policy response to, economic
primitives such as tastes, technology, and privacy of information. For an
informal discussion of the history and economic rationale of limited liability,
see Easterbrook and Fischel (1985).
The ﬁrm is modeled here as making payouts of the good it produces, and
those payouts cannot exceed in the aggregate the ﬁrm’s output in any state of
nature. However, there is an equivalent way of describing the way in which
the allocation is implemented. That is, the ﬁrm promises state-contingent
payouts to investors that exceed, in the aggregate, its output in some states of
nature. Then, in those states of nature, the ﬁrm receives a tax-funded subsidy
to bridge the gap between its output and its aggregate liabilities. According
to this description, the tax/transfer scheme is a bailout of the insolvent ﬁrm.
The tax is collected on investors’ endowments at the date when the subsidy
is paid. The limited-liability constraint speciﬁes that the ﬁrm cannot claim
those endowments directly, so the government’s authority to tax them must be
invoked in order to substitute for the promised payouts that the ﬁrm is unable
to make.
It might be asked, what sense does it make to tax investors’endowments
and then return them? The answer is that the tax is a lump-sum tax but the
indemniﬁcation is dependent on the investors’ continued participation in the
ﬁrm. Thus,thetax-subsidyschemecanaffectincentives. Fromanex-anteper-
spective, it may be essential for providing sufﬁcient incentive to invest along
with others, some of whom (that is, those who suffer an adverse preference
shock) foreseeably will liquidate their investments prematurely.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Sincethereisonlyoneﬁrmintheentireeconomyinthismodel,itshouldbe
interpretedtorepresenttheentireﬁrmsectoroftheeconomy, includingbanks,
other ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. A main insight of Diamond and
Dybvig is that banks contribute to economic welfare by engaging in maturity
transformation, that is, by “borrowing short and lending long.” Banks are not
the only ﬁrms that do this, however. Recent research (cf. Acharya, Gale, and
Yorulmazer 2009) emphasizes that a nonﬁnancial ﬁrm can engage in maturity
transformation on its own behalf through the market for short-term corpo-
rate debt, with essentially the same implication as if it had borrowed from a
maturity-transforming bank. The terminology adopted in this paper—“ﬁrm,”
rather than “bank”—reﬂects a view that the welfare analysis of bailouts as
public policy is largely the same, whether the recipient is a ﬁnancial or a non-
ﬁnancialﬁrm.2 LiketheDiamond-Dybvigmodel, thepresentmodelconcerns
a policy response to a problem in a broad sector of an economy. Regardless of
whether there is one direct recipient of government funds or there are many,
and regardless of whether those direct recipients are ﬁnancial ﬁrms or non-
ﬁnancial ones, a bailout affects the position of the ﬁrm sector (including its
investors) in the aggregate.
1. THE ENVIRONMENT
There are three dates, denoted by 0, 1, 2. There is a large population of
investors, each of whom randomly has one of two utility functions. Each
investor behaves atomistically, and in particular, ascribes zero probability to
the event that he could be a pivotal liability holder whose decision to demand
payment might force the ﬁrm to default.
There is one good at each date, which can be either consumed or, except
at the terminal date 2, transformed into the good at the next date by the tech-
nologies described below.3 Each investor is endowed with ¯ x0 > 0 units of
good at date 0 and ¯ x2 > 0 units of good at date 2 but is not endowed with any
of the date-1 good.
If he is impatient (type 1), then an investor wants to maximize his con-
sumption at date 1 until it has reached a high threshold. If he is patient (type
2), thenhewantstomaximizethesumofhisconsumptionatdate1anddate2.
Date 0 is a date at which each investor can invest his endowment or exchange
for a liability of the ﬁrm, which invests it, but at which no consumption takes
2 Diamond and Dybvig introduced the sequential-service constraint, a feature of their model
environment that prevented market transactions from decentralizing the same allocation as banking
contracts implement. Analogously, the limited-liability constraint prevents market transactions from
substituting for a combination of contracts and bailouts in the model to be analyzed here.
3 There will be no explicit technology for transforming date-1 consumption to date-2 con-
sumption, but refraining from early liquidiation of illiquid investment is tantamount to such a
technology.E. J. Green: Bailouts 15
place. Each agent privately learns his own type at date 1 but remains ignorant
of others’types.
An investor’s utility function has three arguments: consumption at date
1, consumption at date 2, and the investor’s type. An impatient investor has
utility
u(c1,c 2,1) = v(c1) + c2
v(x) =

ηx if x ≤ θ;
ηθ + (x − θ) if x>θ ;
(1)
η>1.
A patient investor has utility
u(c1,c 2,2) = c1 + c2. (2)
At date 0, before he knows his type, and at date 1, if the consequences of a
decision depend on other investors’types of which he is ignorant, an investor
maximizes expected utility as explained below.
There is a risk that concerns the fraction of the population that is patient.
In every state of the world, either a fraction μ  or μB of the investors are
impatient, where 0 <μ   <μ B < 1. In subsequent analysis, it will be
assumed that ¯ x0/μB <θ<¯ x0/μ .
An aggregate state of the world in which fraction μB of investors are
impatient occurs with probability β, and 0 <β<1. Denote this aggregate
state by B, and denote its complement by  . (Strictly speaking, B is the event
that comprises all of the bad states in which some group of μB investors is
impatient, and the good aggregate state   is the complementary event.)
Allinvestorsareequallylikelytobepatient,andnoinvestor’stypeismore
highly correlated with the aggregate state than any other’s type is. Thus, if
μ∗
1 is the probability that a particular agent is impatient, then the following
equation is satisﬁed:4
μ∗
1 = βμB + (1 − β)μ . (3)
It follows that, if an investor knows that he is impatient but knows nothing of




4An asterisk superscript indicates in this article that a probability will appear explicitly in
an investor’s expected-utility calculation.
5 Probability β∗
1 is calculated according to Bayes’ Theorem. Game theorists call this the
investor’s interim probability, to distinguish it from posterior probability, which reﬂects knowledge
of both the investor’s own type and also the other investors’ types. Interim expected utility is the
mean of the investor’s utility function with respect to the interim probability measure.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly




2 = β(1 − μB) + (1 − β)(1 − μ ), (5)
and a patient investor believes with probability β∗
2 that event B has occurred,
where
β∗
2 = β(1 − μB)/μ∗
2. (6)
Intuitively, an investor assigns higher probability to B if he discovers that he




Investment must be undertaken at date 0. There are two technologies,
each of which has return that is linear in investment. Liquid technology is just
storage: it returns one unit of output at date 1 for each unit of investment.
Illiquid technology returns R>1 units of consumable output at date 2 for
each unit of investment. However, if a unit is withdrawn at date 1, then it only
yields r<1 units of consumable output. Assume that
R/r < η. (7)
The economic implication of this inequality is that, for an impatient investor
whosedate-1consumptionisbelowθ (sothatthemarginalutilityofconsump-
tion at date 1 is η), the marginal rate of substitution of c1 for c2 (that is, R/r)
is higher than the marginal rate of transformation of c1 into c2 by choosing
between alternate uses of the illiquid technology.
2. EXPECTED UTILITY
The probabilities deﬁned and calculated above provide the basis for calcu-
lating investors’ prior and conditional expected utilities of state-contingent
allocations. In the calculations below, and throughout the rest of this article,
s will denote an individual investor’s state, σ will denote an aggregate state,
and t will denote a date in the model economy. For s ∈ {1,2}σ ∈ {B, },
and t ∈ {1,2}, let csσ
t denote the consumption level at date t in the event
that the investor’s state is s and the aggregate state is σ.A nallocation speci-
ﬁes the consumption level in each of the eight possible combinations of date,
investor’s state, and aggregate state.6
6As is typical in models in which there are many agents whose individual states are i.i.d.
conditional on the aggregate state, so that a law of large numbers can be presumed to hold, it is
unnecessary to distinguish formally between an economy-wide allocation in a generic state of the
world and a bundle of state-contingent commodities for an individual agent in the economy.E. J. Green: Bailouts 17
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The endowment and technologies described above imply a set of technically
feasible cooperative production outcomes if all investors’endowments are in-
vestedjointly,andasetoftechnicallyfeasibleindividualproductionoutcomes
if a single investor invests autarkically. Assume free disposal: If a production
outcome is feasible, then any outcome that provides less consumption at each
date (and, in the case of individual feasibility, for each type) is also feasible.
Since technology is linear, cooperative feasibility can be considered in
per capita terms. A cooperative production plan speciﬁes an amount, ι,o f
the endowment to be invested in the illiquid technology and amounts,  B and
  , of that illiquid investment to be liquidated at date 1 in the two possible
aggregate states. Technical feasibility requires that, for each σ ∈ {B, },
0 ≤  σ ≤ ι ≤¯ x0. (11)
Given production plan π, let yσt denote the output at date t in aggregate state
σ. Then, for π = (ι, B,  ), y is the vector satisfying
yσ1 = (¯ x0 − ι) +  σr;
yσ2 = (ι −  σ)R. (12)
Proposition 1 Ifπ = (ι, B,  )istechnicallyfeasibleandmin( B,  )>0,
thenanothertechnicallyfeasibleproductionplanprovidesstrictlymoreoutput
at both dates and in both aggregate states than π does.
Proof. Let π = (ι, B,  ) be a technically feasible production plan, and de-
ﬁne π  = (ι − min( B,  ), B − min( B,  ),   − min( B,  )). Then18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
π  is also technically feasible, and it has weakly higher output than π at
both dates and in both aggregate states, because resources that π allocates to
early-liquidatedilliquid-technologyproductionarereallocatedinπ  toliquid-
technology production of the same goods (that is, goods at date 1 in the two
aggregate states). If both  B and    are positive, then π  produces strictly
more output at date 1 in each aggregate state than π does, and it produces
identical output to π at date 2 in each aggregate state. Then, by devoting a
slightly higher investment than ι−min( B,  ) to illiquid production, a new,
technically feasible production plan can be constructed that provides strictly
more output at both dates and in both aggregate states than π does.
An allocation is technically feasible for cooperative production if there is
a technically feasible cooperative production plan such that, at each date and
in each aggregate state, the impatient and patient agents together consume no
more than the sum of the output of that plan and the endowment at that date
(that is, 0 at date 1 or ¯ x2 at date 2). Speciﬁcally, c is technically feasible for
cooperative production if, for some feasible production plan π,
μσc1σ
1 + (1 − μσ)c2σ
1 ≤ yσ1;
μσc1σ
2 + (1 − μσ)c2σ
2 ≤ yσ2 +¯ x2. (13)
An autarkic production plan speciﬁes a fraction of ¯ x0 to be invested in the
illiquid technology and fractions  1 and  2 of that investment to be liquidated
atdate1iftheinvestorisimpatientorpatient, respectively. Notethat, sincean
individualinvestordoesnotobservetheaggregatestate,anautarkicproduction
plan cannot depend on it. The output of an autarkic production plan is deﬁned
analogously to (12):
ys1 = (x0 − ι) +  sr;
ys2 = (ι −  s)R. (14)
Moreover, since the aggregate state is irrelevant to either the production




Thus, deﬁne allocation c to be feasible for autarkic production if, for some




2 ≤ ys2 +¯ x2;
cs 
t = csB
t . (15)E. J. Green: Bailouts 19
Proposition 2 If allocation c is feasible for autarkic production, then there is
a technically feasible cooperative production plan with sufﬁcient output per
capita to provide every investor with the same level of consumption at both
dates, in every state, as c provides. If at least one type of investor would
liquidate a positive amount of illiquid investment at date 1 in an autarkic
production plan for c, then there is a cooperative plan with sufﬁciently high
output to provide every investor with higher consumption at both dates, in
every state, than c provides.
Proof. If(ι, 1, 2)isanautarkicproductionplanthatproducessufﬁcientout-
putforcaccordingto(15),then(ι,μB 1 + (1 − μB) 2,μ   1 + (1 − μ ) 2)
isacooperativeproductionplanthatproducessufﬁcientoutputforcaccording
to (12). The second assertion in this proposition follows from Proposition 1
since, if at least one of  1 and  2 is positive, then  B = μB 1 + (1 − μB) 2
and    = μ  1 + (1 − μ ) 2 imply that both  B and    are positive.
4. OPTIMALAUTARKIC PRODUCTION
Considertheproblemofoptimizingexpectedutility,U0(c),amongallocations
that are feasible for autarkic production. Since the feasibility condition (15)
requires that cs 
t = csB

















ity constraints will all hold with equality in (15). That is, c is the entire output
of some autarkic production plan (ι, 1, 2), together with the endowment ¯ x2
at date 2. Making this substitution into (16), and expanding u according to its
deﬁning equations (1) and (2) yields
U0(c) = μ∗
1 [υ ((¯ x0 − ι) +  1r) + (ι −  1)R +¯ x2]
+μ∗
2 [(¯ x0 − ι) +  2r + (ι −  2)R +¯ x2]. (17)
Recall that, by (1), 1 ≤ υ  ≤ η, so, if  ι denotes the derivative of the right







≤  ι ≤ R − 1. (18)
7 Function υ is differentiable except at θ, where the rightmost and leftmost terms in (18)









then the optimal level of ι is the maximal investment level ¯ x0. Condition (19)
will be assumed henceforth, in order to focus on this case.
Thederivativeoftherightsideof(17)withrespectto 2 isμ∗
2(r−R) < 0,
sotheoptimallevelof 2 istheminimumlevel0. Let   denotethederivative




1 (ηr − R) if  1r<θ ;
μ∗
1 (r − R) if  1r>θ . (20)
By assumption (7),    > 0i f 1r is to the left of θ, so the optimal autarkic
production plan must set  1 =¯ x0 if ¯ x0r<θ . Subsequent analysis will focus
on this case.
The following proposition recapitulates what has been established in this
section.






> 0 and ¯ x0r<θ , then (¯ x0, ¯ x0,0) is the
optimal autarkic production plan. If allocation c is the output of this plan,







5. OPTIMAL COOPERATIVE PRODUCTION
Consider the optimal allocation that is technically feasible for cooperative
production. Recall that impatient investors who receive date-1 consumption
less than θ have marginal utility η>1 for consumption at that date, all other
investorshavemarginalutility1fordate-1consumption,andallinvestorshave
marginal utility 1 for date-2 consumption. Recall that output is described in
percapitaterms, sothegreatestamountofoutputyσ1 thatcanbegiventoeach
investor of type 1 at date 1 in aggregate state σ is yσ1/μσ. It follows that, to
maximize expected utility among allocations that distribute y, it is necessary
and sufﬁcient that, for σ ∈ {B, }, min(yσ1/μσ,θ) ≤ c1σ
1 . In particular, it
is optimal to allocate all production output to the impatient investors, at both
dates and in both aggregate states, and to allow every investor to consume his
own endowment, ¯ x2, of the date-2 good. The level of ex-ante expected utility
that this allocation provides is
βμB (ηmin(yB1/μB,θ) + max(yB1/μB − θ,0) + yB2/μB)
+(1 − β)μ  (ηmin(y 1/μ ,θ) + max(y 1/μ  − θ,0) + y 2/μ )
+¯ x2. (21)E. J. Green: Bailouts 21
Ify istheoutputofcooperativeproductionplan(ι, B,  ), then(21)isequiv-
alent to
βμBηmin(((¯ x0 − ι) +  Br)/μB,θ)
+max(((¯ x0 − ι) +  Br)/μB − θ,0) + (ι −  B)R/μB)
+(1 − β)μ ηmin(((¯ x0 − ι) +   r)/μ ,θ)
+max(((¯ x0 − ι) +   r)/μ  − θ,0) + (ι −   )R/μ ) +¯ x2. (22)
Assume that it is technically feasible to provide consumption at least as
high as the low-marginal-utility threshold to impatient investors at date 1 in
aggregate state  , but not in B. That is,
¯ x0/μB <θ<¯ x0/μ . (23)
ItisoptimaltoliquidateallinvestmentinstateB. Thereasonisthat,regardless
of the value of ι, date-1 output with complete liquidation will be (¯ x0 −ι)+ιr,
which is not greater than ¯ x0. If this output is all given to impatient investors
to consume, then each of them receives [(¯ x0 − ι) + ιr]/μB ≤¯ x0/μB <θ ,
at which level the marginal utility of date-1 consumption in state B is η,
versus 1 for date-2 consumption. The marginal rate of transformation of date-
0 endowment to date-1 consumption by means of making illiquid investment
but liquidating it early is r, while the marginal rate of transformation to date-2
consumption by not liquidating is R, so (7) entails that early liquidation is
optimal.
Under some circumstances, it is optimal to make illiquid investment up
to the point where just enough is left over to provide every impatient investor
with θ units of consumption at date 1 in state   and not to liquidate any of
the investment in that state. That is, (¯ x0 − μ θ, ¯ x0 − μ θ,0) is the optimal
cooperative investment plan. These circumstances are now characterized.
Let  − and  + denote the left- and right-hand derivatives of (22) with
respect to ι, evaluated at (ι, B,  ) = (¯ x0 − μ θ, ¯ x0 − μ θ,0). Then
 − = β (R − η) + (1 − β)(R − 1);
 + = R − η. (24)
Now assume that
R − η<0 <R− (βη+ 1 − β). (25)
This entails that  − and  + are positive and negative, respectively, so the
maximum is achieved at ¯ x0 − μ θ, where these directional derivatives were
evaluated. Also, atthatlevelofι, theright-handderivativeof(22)withrespect
to    is r − R<0, which is sufﬁcient, given the concavity of the objective22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
function, for 0 to be the optimum. The following proposition restates the
conclusions of this argument.
Proposition 4 If ¯ x0/μB <θ<¯ x0/μ  and R − η<0 <R− (βη+ 1 − β),
then (¯ x0 − μ θ, ¯ x0 − μ θ,0) is the unique cooperative production plan, the
output of which can be allocated to maximize expected utility U0 among the
allocations that are technically feasible for aggregate production. Allocation
c is optimal among allocations that are feasible from this plan if and only
if c1B
1 = (μ θ + (¯ x0 − μ θ)r)/μB, c1 
1 = θ, c2B
1 = c2 
1 = 0, μBc1B
2 +
(1 − μB)c2B
2 =¯ x2, and μ c1 
2 + (1 − μ )c2 
2 =¯ x2 + R (¯ x0 − μ θ).
Note that it is possible for both premise (19) of Proposition 3 and also
(25) to be satisﬁed, that is,




2,βη+ 1 − β

. (26)
If (23) and (26) both hold, then, by Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, the
optimal level of expected utility that it is technically feasible to obtain from
the cooperative production characterized in Proposition 4 is strictly higher
than the optimal autarkic level.
6. FIRM SECTOR, GOVERNMENT,AND FORMALIZATION
OFA BAILOUT
The model being formulated and analyzed here is a rather abstract one. It
makes no explicit mention of institutions, particularly of ﬁrms or of a gov-
ernment. Yet, the model is being proposed as a tool for gaining insight about
government bailouts of ﬁrms. It is now time to discuss the intended inter-
pretation of the model, in order to justify how a bailout is formalized within
it.
The intended interpretation of cooperative production is that it is the ac-
tivity of a limited-liability ﬁrm. Investors voluntarily give their initial en-
dowments, ¯ x0, to the ﬁrm in return for state-contingent claims against it—the
ﬁrm’s liabilities. However, the ﬁrm is not empowered to come back to the
investors at date 2 and demand part or all of their endowments, ¯ x2. Neither
are the ﬁrm’s creditors so empowered, if the ﬁrm defaults on its liabilities.
A ﬁrm does not have to be incorporated so that its investors have lim-
ited liability, but this is the typical legal arrangement, especially for large
ﬁrms, in the United States and other industrialized countries. Historically,
the widespread existence of limited-liability ﬁrms only goes back for about
a century and a half. Until well into the twentieth century, U.S. banks were
required by law to be chartered with shareholders having “double liability,”
whereby they could be required to contribute up to the par value of theirE. J. Green: Bailouts 23
equity, if necessary, toward meeting the bank’s corporate liabilities.8 Al-
though some ﬁrms today continue to be chartered as general partnerships or
otherformsofcompanywithatleastsomeinvestorshavingunlimitedliability,
it is widely accepted that the corporate form of organization confers beneﬁts
that society would forgo in an unlimited-liability regime (cf. Easterbrook and
Fischel 1985).
Alongside the limited-liability corporations in a modern economy is the
government, which can tax some investors and redistribute the proceeds to
others. In particular, taxation can force an investor’s consumption at date 2
below ¯ x2. Givenanallocationc, foreachindividualstates andaggregatestate
σ there are unique ρsσ ≥ 0 and τsσ ≥ 0 such that
csσ
2 =¯ x2 + ρsσ − τsσ;
ρsσ+ τsσ = min

ρ+τ |ρ≥0 and τ ≥0 and csσ
2 =¯ x2+ρ − τ

. (27)
(The second equation means that, at most, one of ρsσ and τsσ can be positive,
and that both must be zero if csσ
2 =¯ x2.) The quantity ρsσ represents the
investor’s receipts from both corporate payouts and government subsidies,
and τsσ represents the amount of tax that the investor has paid. Feasibility
of an allocation implies a government budget constraint that subsidies cannot
exceed taxes. In particular, if τ1σ = τ2σ = 0, then no tax is collected
in aggregate state σ and therefore no subsidy can be paid out in that state.
Allocation c exhibits subsidy if, for some s and σ, τsσ > 0.
Intuitively, not every subsidy is a bailout. A bailout occurs when an ex-
traordinarilyhighlevelofliquidationoccursandalso(perhapssubsequentlyto
theliquidation)anextraordinarilyhighlevelofsubsidyisprovided. Formally,
a bailout is an aggregate state σ ∈ {B, } such that
Either 0 < min( B,  ) and μστ1σ + (1 − μσ)τ2σ > 0,
or, for σ   = σ,  σ >  σ  and μστ1σ + (1 − μσ)τ2σ >μ σ τ1σ 
+(1 − μσ )τ2σ 
. (28)
The two clauses of this deﬁnition represent situations with different welfare
characteristics. In the ﬁrst clause, early liquidation occurs in both aggregate
states, so the allocation is technically inefﬁcient. The clause states that, in
that context, every aggregate state in which there is positive taxation (and
associated subsidy) is a bailout state. Such a bailout resembles a bank run in
Diamond and Dybvig’s model.9 In contrast, the second clause stipulates that
8 Macey and Miller (1992) provide a history of this requirement, and they argue that it
worked reasonably well as a prudential regulatory regime for banks.
9 In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there is a “run equilibrium” in which early liquidation
takes place in both aggregate states. The allocation resulting from this equilibrium is inefﬁcient,
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early liquidation occurs only in one of the two aggregate states, speciﬁcally in
the one in which tax revenue is highest. That is, liquidation is accompanied
by a higher level of taxation, measured as tax revenue per capita, than is
imposed in the non-bailout state. An allocation in which such a bailout occurs
might, or might not, be optimal. Proposition 5, to be proved in Section 8,
states that there is an economy in which a bailout occurs in one of the optimal
allocations. Proposition 6, to be proved in Section 9, states that, when the
model is modiﬁed by positing a convex deadweight cost of taxation, there is
an economy in which a bailout must occur in the unique optimal allocation.
The relationship between the formal deﬁnition of a bailout provided here
and the informal deﬁnition stated in the introduction deserves comment. The
informaldeﬁnitionreferstosubsidyforthepurposeofpreventingormitigating
insolvency. The formal deﬁnition refers to a correlation between subsidy and
early liquidation of investments. The idea that links the two deﬁnitions is that
early liquidation is a drastic measure that must be taken to avert or minimize
insolvency under laissez faire, and that it has adverse effects prima facie.
Especiallyinthecasethatasubsidywouldbecompletelysuccessfulinaverting
insolvencywithouthavingrecoursetoearlyliquidation,therecouldnotbeany
correlation of the subsidy with early liquidation. Thus, a subsidy that ﬁts the
intuitive deﬁnition of subsidy would not ﬁt the formal deﬁnition. Conversely,
ifaﬁrmcanmeetitsobligationsbymeansofearlyliquidation,andifasubsidy
is provided when early liquidation is used for that purpose, then—providing
that the ﬁrm could be forced to liquidate rather than having to be bribed with
the subsidy to do so—the subsidy is not necessary to avert insolvency. That
is, the subsidy would ﬁt the formal deﬁnition of a bailout but not the informal
deﬁnition. Nevertheless, although some adjustment of both the informal and
formal deﬁnitions of a bailout to reconcile their meanings would be desirable
in principle, the formal deﬁnition succeeds well in capturing the intent of
the informal deﬁnition in the examples to be studied below. The issue of
deﬁnitional ﬁt here is typical, not exceptional. Formal concepts introduced
in scientiﬁc theories seldom match exactly the informal concepts that they
supplant.
7. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
Since each investor’s information about his own state is private, investors
mustbewillingtoreportittruthfullyinorderforanaggregateproductionplan
and the allocation that distributes its output to distinguish between B and  
(cf. Myerson 1979). That is, evaluated according to the conditional expected
utilityoftheinvestor’struetype, whattheallocationgivestothattypeisbetter
than what it gives to the opposite type (that is, than what he would get if he
were to report his type falsely). To formalize this idea, let ˜ c be the allocation
that, at each date and in each aggregate state, gives an impatient investor whatE. J. Green: Bailouts 25
c gives a patient investor and vice versa. That is, for all t and σ, and for each
s ∈ {1,2}, ˜ csσ
t = c
(3−s)σ
t .10 Allocation c is incentive compatible if, for each
s ∈ {1,2},11
Us (c) ≥ Us (˜ c). (29)
Note that, according to the terminology adopted in this article, feasible
means technically feasible, and does not imply incentive compatibility. Opti-
malmeansmaximalwithrespecttoexpectedutilityamongfeasibleproduction
plans, rather than among plans that are both technically feasible and incen-
tive compatible. However, an allocation cannot actually be implemented in
a private-information environment unless it is both technically feasible and
incentive compatible. The reason is that, unless the allocation is incentive
compatible, investors will not voluntarily make the state-contingent choices
that are required to implement it, and those choices must be made voluntarily
becausetheydependoncontingenciesthatwouldhavetobe—butcannotbe—
observed by some third party in order to be enforced coercively. The remain-
der of the article will be a study of the questions: Can an optimal allocation
be incentive compatible and, if so, must a subsidy or even a bailout be pro-
vided in some state of the world in order to satisfy the incentive-compatibility
constraint (29)?
8. OPTIMALITY, INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY,AND
SUBSIDY
Here is an example of an economy in which there is an allocation that is
both optimal for cooperative production (as in Proposition 4) and incentive
compatible,andinwhicheveryallocationthatsatisﬁesbothoftheseconditions
exhibits subsidy. Consider the following parameter values:
¯ x0 = 3; ¯ x2 = 1; β = 0.06; μB =
5
6
; μ  =
1
2
; θ = 4; R = 2; r =
1
2
; η = 5.
(30)
10 It would not necessarily be technically feasible to give the consumption speciﬁed by ˜ c
to every investor. The point of deﬁning ˜ c is to specify what an investor would get by deviating
unilaterally from truthful revelation. Such a unilateral deviation, by an investor whose individ-
ual consumption is inﬁnitesimal compared to aggregate consumption, would not cause incentive
compatibility to be violated.
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These values satisfy (23) and (26). By Proposition 4, the optimal cooper-
ative production plan is (ι, B,  ) = (1,1,0), and an optimal allocation, c,
of the product, y, of this plan, if it does not exhibit subsidy, must satisfy
c1B
1 = yB1/μB = 3;
c1 
1 = θ = 4;
c2B
1 = c2 
1 = 0;
μ c1 
2 + (1 − μ )c2 
2 =¯ x2 + y 2 = 3;
csB
2 = 1 for s ∈ {1,2};
cs 
2 ≥ 1 for s ∈ {1,2}. (31)
For the allocation to be incentive compatible for a patient investor, ac-
cording to (29), U2(c) − U2(˜ c) ≥ 0 must be satisﬁed. U2(c) − U2(˜ c) is
increasing in c2 
2 and decreasing in c1 
2 . In an optimal allocation, by (31), a
patient investor can only consume at date 2 and must consume exactly one
unit at that date in aggregate state B. Therefore, if any optimal allocation can
be incentive compatible for the patient investor but not exhibit subsidy, then
one such allocation will give all date-2 output to patient investors. That is, the
following allocation should be checked for incentive compatibility:
c1B




1 = c2 
1 = 0;
c1B





2 = Rι/μ  + 1 = 5. (32)
But this allocation is obviously not incentive compatible. A patient in-
vestor’s utility function is u(c1,c 2,2) = c1 +c2, and this quantity is identical
for a patient and an impatient investor in aggregate state   and strictly higher
for an impatient investor in state B. The consequence for condition (32) is
that
U2(c) − U2(˜ c) =− 3β∗
2 ≈− .063. (33)
Taxing impatient investors’ endowments at date 2, and transferring the
tax revenue to patient investors, converts c to a new allocation that is equal
to c with regard to ex ante expected utility, and that is incentive compatible.
Speciﬁcally, deﬁne allocation d by taxing one unit of impatient investors’
endowment in state   and transferring it to patient investor. That is,E. J. Green: Bailouts 27
dsσ
t = csσ




2 = 6. (34)
It is obvious from (32) that, when the date-2 consumption of patient investors
inc isincreasedbytworelativetoimpatientinvestorswithprobabilitycloseto
one, the resulting allocation, d, is incentive compatible for patient investors.
To be precise, the incentive-compatibility constraint (29) for patient investors
evaluates (after rounding) to 5.9 > 4.0, so the constraint is satisﬁed. For im-
patient investors, (29) evaluates to 6.9 > 5.5, so their incentive-compatibility
constraint is also satisﬁed.
There is no bailout in allocation d, however, because liquidation occurs
in one state but a tax is levied (and subsidy is distributed) only in the other.
Consider optimal allocation e, in which taxation occurs in the bad state along
with liquidation. That is, a bailout occurs in this allocation:
esσ
t = csσ




2 = 6. (35)
Theincentive-compatibilitycondition(29)evaluatesto5.02 > 4.96forpatient
investors and to 7.8 > 5.1 for impatient investors. The following proposition
summarizes these ﬁndings.
Proposition 5 Everytechnicallyfeasibleallocationoftheeconomydescribed
by (30) either is suboptimal, violates incentive compatibility, or exhibits sub-
sidy. Theeconomyhassomeallocationsthataretechnicallyfeasible, optimal,
and incentive compatible. All such allocations exhibit subsidy. In some of
them, a bailout occurs.
9. ESSENTIAL BAILOUTS
Bailoutsaredeﬁnedasessentialinaneconomyifoneoccursineveryallocation
of that economy that is optimal subject to incentive compatibility constraints.
In this section, the model of an economy is modiﬁed in such a way that there
is an example in which bailouts are essential.
One way to make such a change would be, in effect, to gerrymander the
model. We specify that the marginal utility of consumption for impatient
investors at date 2 is lower in aggregate state B, but higher in state  , than that
for patient investors. We also specify that each investor’s date-2 endowment
is state contingent, and is perfectly correlated with the investor’s preference
type, speciﬁcally with an investor having a larger endowment when impatient28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
than when patient. Optimality subject to incentive compatibility would then
requirethetransferfromimpatienttopatientinvestorstobemaximizedatdate
2inB,anditwouldrequirethetransferfrompatienttoimpatientagentsatdate
2i n  to be maximized, subject to incentive compatibility. If early liquidation
is required in B to achieve the optimal level of ex-ante utility, subject only to
technical feasibility, and if incentive-compatibility constraints do not bind in
that allocation, then bailouts are essential in the economy.
This sketch of an example shows that, in principle, either the deﬁnition
of a bailout or the deﬁnition of essentiality needs to be tightened. That is, the
two deﬁnitions together should express the idea that subsidy is being used in
the bailout state to solve an incentive problem created intrinsically by early
liquidation, rather than playing a distinct role having to do with insurance.
Since all investors’ utility for consumption at date 2 is assumed to be linear
and identical across individual states (implying that there is no possibility of
increasing ex-ante welfare by equalizing different investors’marginal utilities
at date 2) in the example studied in Section 8, the current deﬁnitions seem
satisfactory, as long as that assumption is maintained.
Consider an alternative modiﬁcation of the model: the introduction of a
convex deadweight cost of taxation. Let δ be a convex function satisfying
δ(τ) = 0 for all τ ≤ 0, and δ is strictly convex at positive tax levels. This
function speciﬁes, for each investor, how much consumption is lost to the
economy when tax is collected from him.12 To formalize this idea, replace
the deﬁnition (13) of technical feasibility for cooperative production with
μσc1σ
1 + (1 − μσ)c2σ
1 ≤ yσ1; (36)
μσc1σ
2 + (1 − μσ)c2σ









A calculus result, Jensen’s inequality, implies the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If δ is strictly convex for τ>0, and if technical feasibility of an
allocation for aggregate production is deﬁned by (36), then τ1B = τ1 and
τ2B = τ2  in an allocation that is optimal subject to technical feasibility
and incentive compatibility. By strict convexity of δ, this constrained-efﬁcient
allocation is generically unique.13
Using this lemma, it is routine to calculate an allocation f, analogous to e
in Section 8, that is optimal among technically feasible, incentive-compatible
12 The cost includes the direct cost of collecting and enforcing taxes and the indirect cost
(in an actual economy, as opposed to the highly simpliﬁed model economy) of agents shifting
resources to low-productivity, but tax-favored, investments. Embedding a costly state veriﬁcation
model of tax collection (along the lines of Townsend [1979]) in the model economy would provide
a foundation for this reduced-form speciﬁcation.
13 Generically means that, for any parameter vector having more than one such allocation,
the economy corresponding to an arbitrarily small perturbation of that vector in a random direction
will have a unique optimum.E. J. Green: Bailouts 29
allocationsoftheeconomythatisidenticaltotheonestudiedinSection8(with
parameters speciﬁed in [30]), except that technical feasibility is deﬁned ac-
cording to (36). By the lemma, this can be taken to be the unique constrained-
efﬁcient allocation of the economy. In the allocation, τ1σ > 0 = τ2σ. By the
lemma, the tax does not depend on σ. Thus, let ˆ τ denote the tax levied on
impatient investors in both states. The amount of tax levied is ˆ τ/2 in state  
and 5ˆ τ/6 in state B. This means that B is the high-subsidy state, as well as
being the early-liquidation state, so there is a bailout. Since the allocation in
question is the unique constrained-efﬁcient allocation, bailouts are essential
in this economy.





ζτ2 if τ ≥ 0. (37)
Consider the economy with parameters speciﬁed in (30) and with the set of
feasible allocations speciﬁed to incorporate a deadweight cost of taxation
according to (36) and (37). Modify allocation c, deﬁned in (32), to specify a
feasible allocation f of this economy, deﬁned in terms of a positive parameter





2 =¯ x2 −







2 =¯ x2 + 5ˆ τ;
f 2 
2 =¯ x2 + 2Rι+ˆ τ. (38)
That is, set f equal to c at date 1, set the consumption level of an impatient
investor at date 2 to be the investor’s date-2 endowment minus the sum of a
tax ˆ τ and the deadweight cost of its imposition, and set the consumption level
of a patient investor at date 2 to be the sum of the investor’s endowment and
the investor’s share of both the date-2 investment proceeds from plan (1,1,0)
and the receipt from the taxation of impatient investors.
If ζ = 0 and ˆ τ<¯ x2, then allocation f is optimal. If ζ>0 and
ˆ τ>0, then f is not optimal because δ(ˆ τ) > 0, and this deadweight cost
must be deducted from consumption. However, for the parameter values
speciﬁedin(30),asubsidyisnecessarytoachieveincentivecompatibility,and
logically this is true under an assumption that ζ>0, since the set of feasible
allocations for positive ζ is a subset of those for ζ = 0. Optimality subject
to incentive compatibility is achieved when the tax, ˆ τ, is minimized, subject
to the constraint that the resulting allocation should be incentive compatible.
That value of ˆ τ is the one that makes the incentive-compatibility constraint
for patient investors hold with equality, that is,30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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f is the unique allocation that is technically feasible and is also optimal sub-
ject to the incentive-compatibility constraints for both patient and impatient
investors. In f, since ˆ τ is collected from 5
6 of the investors in state B but only
from 1
2 of them in state  , aggregate tax revenue in B is 5
3 times aggregate
tax revenue in  . That is, given that early liquidation occurs in B but not
in  , allocation f exhibits a bailout in B, and this bailout is essential. The
following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 6 Undertheassumptionthattaxinganinvestorhasconvexdead-
weight cost, there is an economy in which bailouts are essential.
10. CONCLUSION
Occasionalbailoutsofinsolventﬁrmsthatareultimatelyﬁnancedbytaxation—
notably including bailouts of ﬁnancial intermediaries—are a fact of life in vir-
tually every country. On one side of a debate about the welfare assessment of
such bailouts are economists, such as Kareken (1983) and Stern and Feldman
(2004), who emphasize that inefﬁcient risk-taking results from a combination
of time inconsistency on the part of the government and moral hazard on the
part of ﬁrms’owners, liability holders, and managers. On the other side, there
hasbeenonlyanamorphousplea,albeitasincereonefromsomedistinguished
economists and sophisticated policymakers and ﬁnancial-market participants,
that unspeciﬁed but very serious and long-term harms would result if govern-
ment were to refrain from a bailout. At ﬁrst sight, such a plea seems to beE. J. Green: Bailouts 31
a reﬂection of precisely the time inconsistency that is pivotal to the critics’
arguments. However, there is another possible interpretation of the point that
apologists for bailouts are trying to make. Namely, once a regime has been
established that favors the incorporation of limited-liability ﬁrms, bailing out
those ﬁrms in some states of the world may be the only way to make ex-ante
efﬁcient investments incentive compatible. While critics believe that it would
be time inconsistent to conduct a bailout, apologists believe that it would
be time inconsistent to refrain from a bailout in some circumstances. The
long-term harm that they fear is impairment, after an ex-ante commitment to
incentive-enhancing bailouts had been shown not to be credible, of investors’
willingness to fund socially beneﬁcial projects. This paper, particularly in
Proposition 6, develops the logic of that position.
It should be kept in mind that this article has explored the logic of an
economic argument, rather than having advocated a policy. Issues of ﬁrst-
rank importance in an actual economy, such as the effect that anticipating a
bailout to be available will have on ﬁrm owners’ and managers’ incentive to
take risk, do not arise in the model economy studied here. Nevertheless, this
analysisshowsthatpublicdiscussionregardingthebailoutofﬁrmsbytheU.S.
government during the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008–2009 has had shortcomings.
It has generally been asserted by critics of the bailout, and conceded by its
proponents, that a tax-ﬁnanced subsidy to ﬁrms is ex ante a bad policy. This
assertion is not sound with respect to the model economy analyzed here. It
maywellbesoundwithrespecttotheU.S.economy, butthatjudgmentshould
begivenasupportingargumentratherthantakenasastartingpoint. Atradeoff
has to be made between the potential beneﬁts of a bailout emphasized in the
present model and the costs that are emphasized in other models. It is an
oversimpliﬁcation to presume that a bailout is necessarily all bad.
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